On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00883-yzbMath1546.9117MaRDI QIDQ6581890

Kwanghyun Kim

Publication date: 1 August 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesex-post Nash equilibriummultilateral trading mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• A dominant strategy double auction
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Implementation with interdependent valuations
• Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
• Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange

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