Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?

Cites Work

Unnamed Item
Unnamed Item
Unnamed Item
Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-attacker game
Double bound method for solving the $p$-center location problem
Bee colony optimization for the $p$-center problem
The continuous center set of a network
Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist
Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
Sequential, nonzero-sum ``Blotto: allocating defensive resources prior to attack
Center problems with pos/neg weights on trees
Stackelberg production-protection games: defending crop production against intentional attacks
An exact solution approach for the interdiction median problem with fortification
Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness
The Price of Fairness
Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
Optimal Algorithms for the Weighted p-Center Problems on the Real Line for Small p
On the Solution Value of the Continuous p-Center Location Problem on a Graph
Improved Complexity Bounds for Center Location Problems on Networks by Using Dynamic Data Structures
A continuous game of ambush
An $O ( ( n\log p )^2 )$ Algorithm for the Continuous p-Center Problem on a Tree
Minimax regret p-center location on a network with demand uncertainty
Solving thep-Center problem with Tabu Search and Variable Neighborhood Search
Governments' and Terrorists' Defense and Attack in a T-Period Game
Shortest path interdiction problem with arc improvement recourse: A multiobjective approach
Location Science
An Ambush Game with an Unknown Number of Infiltrators
Discrete Center Problems

This page was built for publication: Fighting terrorism: how to position rapid response teams?