Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003zbMath1546.91162MaRDI QIDQ6584593

Nabil Afodjo, Roland Pongou

Publication date: 8 August 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymaximalitystructural conditionsanonymous two-sided economiespairwise stable matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

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• Stable Matching in Large Economies
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unilateral stability in matching problems

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