Capacity design in school choice
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Publication:6584598
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.002zbMath1546.91177MaRDI QIDQ6584598
Martin Van der Linden, Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Umut Mert Dur
Publication date: 8 August 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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