Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.04.003zbMATH Open1542.91076MaRDI QIDQ6589391

Agustín G. Bonifacio

Publication date: 19 August 2024

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityGibbard-Satterthwaite theoremdictatorial powertops-only rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Tops-only domains
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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