Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests

DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01534-9zbMATH Open1542.9111MaRDI QIDQ6590141

Hideo Konishi, Nicolas Sahuguet, Benoît S. Y. Crutzen

Publication date: 21 August 2024

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcontestteam

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• The theory of contests: a survey
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Introduction to the special issue on contests
• Rank Effects in Bargaining: Evidence from Government Formation
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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