Consequences of fluctuating group size for the evolution of cooperation

DOI10.1007/s00285-010-0367-3zbMath1230.92035arXiv1010.5478OpenAlexW2004338520WikidataQ47409274 ScholiaQ47409274MaRDI QIDQ659026

Thilo Gross, Ulf Dieckmann, Åke Brännström, Bernd Blasius

Publication date: 9 February 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.5478

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

Eco-evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas ⋮ Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action ⋮ Evolutionary branching in deme-structured populations ⋮ Rewards based on public loyalty program promote cooperation in public goods game ⋮ Effects of relatedness on the evolution of cooperation in nonlinear public goods games ⋮ Individual-based competition between species with spatial correlation and aggregation ⋮ Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games ⋮ Relationship between aggregation of rewards and the possibility of polymorphism in continuous snowdrift games ⋮ Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer's dilemmas ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations ⋮ On inferring evolutionary stability in finite populations using infinite population models ⋮ The hitchhiker's guide to adaptive dynamics

Cites Work

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• Ecological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation
• Invasion dynamics and attractor inheritance
• Resident-invader dynamics and the coexistence of similar strategies
• The dynamical theory of coevolution: A derivation from stochastic ecological processes
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• CHAOS IN COOPERATION: CONTINUOUS-VALUED PRISONER’S DILEMMAS IN INFINITE-VALUED LOGIC
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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