Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111775zbMATH Open1546.91024MaRDI QIDQ6594328

Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 28 August 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamecoalition structureaxiomequal surplus sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

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• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The in-group egalitarian Owen values

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