Equal surplus sharing values for games with coalition structures
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Publication:6594328
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111775zbMATH Open1546.91024MaRDI QIDQ6594328
Publication date: 28 August 2024
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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