Multidimensional screening after 37 years

Cites Work

Unnamed Item
Unnamed Item
Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum
Haggling over substitutes
A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
Monopoly and product quality
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
Selling two identical objects
An algorithm for computing solutions of variational problems with global convexity constraints
Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
Characterization of the subdifferentials of convex functions
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
Optimal Auction Design
Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
The Implementation Duality
Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
Mechanism design without quasilinearity
When Is Pure Bundling Optimal?
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Detecting profitable deviations