(Large) finite to continuum: an approximation result for electoral competition models
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Publication:6596160
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103013zbMATH Open1544.91124MaRDI QIDQ6596160
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Publication date: 2 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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