Matrix representations of Berge stabilities in the graph model for conflict resolution

DOI10.1007/s10479-023-05555-4zbMATH Open1544.91113MaRDI QIDQ6596956

Yan Saraiva Cordeiro, Leandro C. Rêgo

Publication date: 3 September 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matrix representationreciprocityaltruismgraph modelconflict resolutionsBerge stabilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of graph theory (05C90)

Cites Work

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