A flow-based ascending auction to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices

DOI10.1002/net.22218zbMATH Open1544.91153MaRDI QIDQ6599058

Niklas Rieken, Britta Peis, S. Thomas McCormick, Katharina Eickhoff, Laura Vargas Koch

Publication date: 5 September 2024

Published in: Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionsmatching marketsWalrasian equilibriumprice monotonicityflow-algorithmnetwork-flow model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• The English auction with differentiated commodities
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• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• ALGORITHMS FOR L-CONVEX FUNCTION MINIMIZATION: CONNECTION BETWEEN DISCRETE CONVEX ANALYSIS AND OTHER RESEARCH FIELDS
• A Note on Kelso and Crawford's Gross Substitutes Condition

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