Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.002zbMath1231.91007OpenAlexW2139796853MaRDI QIDQ660091

Kiho Yoon

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismrandom assignmentexpenditure inefficiencyrank-order ruleswinner-take-all assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ An experimental study of voting with costly delay ⋮ A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets ⋮ What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals ⋮ Welfare maximizing allocation without transfers ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties

Cites Work

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• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Stochastic orders
• Lottery rather than waiting-line auction
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Optimal Auction Design
• Inequalities for Linear Combinations of Order Statistics from Restricted Families
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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