On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
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Publication:660094
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.09.001zbMath1231.91034OpenAlexW3125249096MaRDI QIDQ660094
Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi
Publication date: 25 January 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.001
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (9)
Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection ⋮ Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information ⋮ A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes
Cites Work
- Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
- Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
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