On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.09.001zbMath1231.91034OpenAlexW3125249096MaRDI QIDQ660094

Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessequilibrium selectionincomplete informationcontagionsupermodular gameglobal game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (9)

Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection ⋮ Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information ⋮ A dominance solvable global game with strategic substitutes

Cites Work

• Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
• Costs of flexibility and equilibrium selection
• Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
• Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
• Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games

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