A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2011.08.007zbMath1231.91123OpenAlexW2091864777MaRDI QIDQ660100

Omer Lev

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp542.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designincentive compatibilitymulti-dimensional mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity

Cites Work

• Haggling over substitutes
• Approximating optimization problems over convex functions
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Auction Design

This page was built for publication: A two-dimensional problem of revenue maximization