On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.003zbMath1231.91035OpenAlexW2010785454MaRDI QIDQ660103

Mark Voorneveld, Elias Tsakas

Publication date: 25 January 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/15c0be56-33fe-4d44-867e-feb3396f43aa

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeconsensuscommunication protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Learning to agree over large state spaces, Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems

Cites Work

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• Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first?
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• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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