Weighted fair division of indivisible items: a review
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Publication:6602330
DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2024.106519zbMATH Open1544.91167MaRDI QIDQ6602330
Publication date: 11 September 2024
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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- Approximation algorithms for the weighted Nash social welfare via convex and non-convex programs
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