Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2024.105876zbMATH Open1544.91178MaRDI QIDQ6604764

Justin Burkett, Maxwell Rosenthal

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyincomplete preferencesmoral hazarddata driven contract design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Decision Makers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Robust Incentives for Teams

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