Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers
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Publication:6604767
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105878zbMATH Open1544.91088MaRDI QIDQ6604767
Publication date: 13 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
- General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis
- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
- Monotonicity and Implementability
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Optimal Auction Design
- Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
- When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
- Optimal Transport
- Test Design Under Falsification
- Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
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