Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning
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Publication:6604770
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2024.105881zbMATH Open1544.91056MaRDI QIDQ6604770
Panayotis Mertikopoulos, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 13 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
similarity-based learningregularized learningnested logit choicenested pairwise proportional imitationnested replicator dynamics
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