Which `intensional paradoxes' are paradoxes?
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Publication:6606835
DOI10.1007/S10992-024-09761-8MaRDI QIDQ6606835
Publication date: 17 September 2024
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
normal formsquantified propositional logicRussell's paradox of propositionsconstructive \textit{reductio}prior's intensional paradoxesproof-theoretic criterion of paradoxicality
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