Partial allocations in budget-feasible mechanism design: bridging multiple levels of service and divisible agents
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Publication:6609125
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_3MaRDI QIDQ6609125
Artem Tsikiridis, Guido Schäfer, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Amanatidis, Sophie Klumper
Publication date: 20 September 2024
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
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