Selling to multiple no-regret buyers

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_7MaRDI QIDQ6609133

Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, Shirley Zhang

Publication date: 20 September 2024

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design
• Optimal Auction Design
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• Non‐Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design
• The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization
• Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
• Generalized Reduced-Form Auctions: A Network-Flow Approach

This page was built for publication: Selling to multiple no-regret buyers