Recovering single-crossing preferences from approval ballots

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_11MaRDI QIDQ6609139

Roger Wattenhofer, Andrei Constantinescu

Publication date: 20 September 2024

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmscomputational complexityapproval votingsingle-crossing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

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• Core-stable committees under restricted domains

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