A mechanism for participatory budgeting with funding constraints and project interactions

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_19MaRDI QIDQ6609153

Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar, Ashish Goel, Mohak Goyal

Publication date: 20 September 2024

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfixed parameter tractabilityparticipatory budgeting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• FPT approximation schemes for maximizing submodular functions
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting
• The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Substitution with Satiation: A New Class of Utility Functions and a Complementary Pivot Algorithm
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Auditing for core stability in participatory budgeting

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