Target-oriented regret minimization for satisficing monopolists

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_32MaRDI QIDQ6609174

Napat Rujeerapaiboon, Yize Wei, Yilin Xue

Publication date: 20 September 2024

zbMATH Keywords

robust optimizationmechanism designregret minimizationsatisficingmonopoly pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

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