``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
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Publication:6615363
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103044MaRDI QIDQ6615363
Indrajit Ray, Françoise Forges
Publication date: 8 October 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
experimentcorrelated equilibriumrecommendationmultistage gamepure strategy equilibriumcommunication equilibrium
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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