Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation

DOI10.1016/j.camwa.2011.08.015zbMath1232.91555OpenAlexW1985425008MaRDI QIDQ662220

Yong Zhao, Congjun Rao, Chuan-Feng Li

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Computers \& Mathematics with Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.camwa.2011.08.015

zbMATH Keywords

validityincentive mechanismuniform price auctionfree allocationTPPDC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• EPA's new emissions trading mechanism: A laboratory evaluation
• Survey of mathematical programming models in air pollution management
• Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: non-commitment as a strategic tool
• Research challenges in environmental management
• MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS

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