Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0275-9zbMath1233.91060OpenAlexW2042411007MaRDI QIDQ662274

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10375/1/MPRA_paper_10375.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumfair lotteriesstrategic gambling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (3)

Submission costs in risk-taking contests ⋮ Budget-constrained multi-battle contests: a new perspective and analysis ⋮ Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production

Cites Work

• Increasing dominance with no efficiency effect
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Contest success functions
• The Colonel Blotto game
• All-Pay Contests
• A Definition of Subjective Probability

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