Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0274-XzbMath1239.91010OpenAlexW2120693554MaRDI QIDQ662280

Licun Xue, Ling-Ling Zhang

Publication date: 22 February 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0274-x

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyexternalitiescoalition formationbidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
• An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
• Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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