Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games
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Publication:6623763
DOI10.1007/s00199-024-01565-wMaRDI QIDQ6623763
Chuangyin Dang, Peixuan Li, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 24 October 2024
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
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