Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
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Publication:6624498
DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01519-0MaRDI QIDQ6624498
Patrick Lederer, Felix Brandt, René Romen
Publication date: 25 October 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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