Unemployment volatility: when workers pay costs upon accepting jobs

DOI10.1111/ijet.12405MaRDI QIDQ6631797

Rich Ryan

Publication date: 1 November 2024

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

unemploymentmatching functionsearch frictionsfundamental surplusjob finding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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• On the heterogeneous short‐term effects of minimum wages on labor demand
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• The optimal long‐run earned income tax credit
• Asset Prices and Unemployment Fluctuations: A Resolution of the Unemployment Volatility Puzzle
• Optimal growth with labor market frictions

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