Efficient incentives with social preferences
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Publication:6631802
DOI10.3982/TE5335MaRDI QIDQ6631802
Publication date: 1 November 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
contestsmechanism designmoney pumpsocial preferencesparticipation constraintsBayesian implementationparticipation stimulation
Cites Work
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- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Robust Mechanism Design
- A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
- Multilevel marketing: Pyramid‐shaped schemes or exploitative scams?
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