Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

DOI10.3982/TE5523MaRDI QIDQ6631808

Ashwin Kambhampati

Publication date: 1 November 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessmoral hazardteams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Robust incentives for risk
• Robust Incentives for Teams

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