Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice

DOI10.3982/te5915MaRDI QIDQ6631811

Krittanai Laohakunakorn, Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 1 November 2024

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingoccupational choicelarge markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

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