Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.05.011MaRDI QIDQ6634109

Marc Vorsatz, Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, Oihane Gallo

Publication date: 6 November 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

single-dipped preferencesstrategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencessocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Single-basined choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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