Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6634137
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.013MaRDI QIDQ6634137
Publication date: 6 November 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- The core of a monetary economy without trust
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers
- A dynamic school choice model
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
- MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
- Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms
- Family ties: School assignment with siblings
- Directed Matching and Monetary Exchange
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Dynamically stable matching
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- Partitionable choice functions and stability
This page was built for publication: Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
