On the individual and coalitional manipulability of \(q\)-Paretian social choice rules
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Publication:6637502
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_7MaRDI QIDQ6637502
Vyacheslav Yakuba, Fuad T. Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander B. Ivanov
Publication date: 13 November 2024
Cites Work
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- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Arrovian aggregation models
- Weighted committee games
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
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