A fair procedure in a marriage market
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Publication:6641268
DOI10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4MaRDI QIDQ6641268
Aditya Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina
Publication date: 20 November 2024
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
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