Optimal student allocation with peer effects
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Publication:6641269
DOI10.1007/s10058-024-00349-xMaRDI QIDQ6641269
Roberto Sarkisian, Takuro Yamashita
Publication date: 20 November 2024
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
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