Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
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Publication:6642573
DOI10.4204/EPTCS.335.14MaRDI QIDQ6642573
Publication date: 24 November 2024
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
Cites Work
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