Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped
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Publication:6642832
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103048MaRDI QIDQ6642832
Yuki Tamura, Bas Dietzenbacher
Publication date: 25 November 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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