Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061MaRDI QIDQ6642837

Steven Kivinen

Publication date: 25 November 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

votingequityPareto efficiencyneutralityanonymity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• The finer structure of resolute, neutral, and anonymous social choice correspondences
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Transitive permutation groups and equipotent voting rules
• Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Homogeneous Games. II
• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Equitable Voting Rules
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

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