Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent
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Publication:6642838
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062MaRDI QIDQ6642838
Kolagani Paramahamsa, Debasis Mishra
Publication date: 25 November 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle
- Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
- Monopoly and product quality
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Selling two identical objects
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
- Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
- An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
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