Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
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Publication:6642840
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103064MaRDI QIDQ6642840
Publication date: 25 November 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
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- Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
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