Credal imprecision and the value of evidence

DOI10.1111/NOUS.12417MaRDI QIDQ6645334

Nilanjan Das

Publication date: 28 November 2024

Published in: Nôus (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Demystifying dilation
• Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis. 2nd ed
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Decision Theory as Philosophy
• Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
• The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference
• Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia
• A treatise on probability.

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