The study of the strategic consequences of a scoring model disclosure

DOI10.1134/S0005117924700139MaRDI QIDQ6646029

Marina S. Sandomirskaya, G. M. Kryukov

Publication date: 29 November 2024

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamemanipulationinformation disclosurescoring model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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