Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games

DOI10.1016/j.physleta.2024.129951MaRDI QIDQ6650160

Linjie Liu, Runyu Yan, Mingquan Xu, Shijia Hua

Publication date: 6 December 2024

Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of cooperationpure punishmentpure rewardcollective-risk social dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Quantum theory (81-XX) Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites Work

• Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment
• Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
• Public cooperation in two-layer networks with asymmetric interaction and learning environments
• Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the \(N\)-person stag hunt game
• Evolution of cooperation in heterogeneously stochastic interactions
• Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game
• Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
• EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
• Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism

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