Evolution of cooperation under pure institutional reward and punishment in collective-risk social dilemma games
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Publication:6650160
DOI10.1016/j.physleta.2024.129951MaRDI QIDQ6650160
Linjie Liu, Runyu Yan, Mingquan Xu, Shijia Hua
Publication date: 6 December 2024
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games
- Governance of risky public goods under the threat of ostracism
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