Property rights and investments: an evolutionary approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.001zbMath1278.91033OpenAlexW2153756061MaRDI QIDQ665071

Luciano Andreozzi

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessheterogeneous agentsevolutionspecific investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

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